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Social and Economic Change since 





Between 1994 and 2004, the South African electorate changed in a number of 
important respects.  Approximately one-third of the potential electorate in 2004 
was too young to vote in 1994; they comprise a post-apartheid generation, for 
whom apartheid was something learnt about, not remembered.  Inter-provincial 
migration also shapes potential voting patterns. Social and economic change 
after apartheid has begun to reshape political cleavages in South Africa, 
although the process has been muted due to the resilience of racial identity, 
deep-rooted political loyalties and the particular character of social and 
economic grievances.  The growing black middle-class enjoys considerable 
political power, as does organised labour (which includes typical middle-class 
occupations such as teachers as well as more conventional working-class 
occupations).  Both of these classes have distinct class interests, and have 
secured public policies that favour them.  Although there are signs of rising 
class consciousness among the poor, this is yet to find political expression in 





Voting behaviour in most countries is shaped by voters’ social and economic 
positions. Social and economic changes therefore often have profound electoral 
implications, eroding support for some parties while improving opportunities for 
others. Since the end of apartheid in 1994, South African society has changed 
dramatically, with the rapid growth of the black middle-classes at the same time 
as rising unemployment and declining life expectancy due to AIDS. Inequality 
has continued to shift from race to class, with growing intra-racial inequalities. 
Yet these social and economic changes have not recast the country’s political 
cleavages. Racial identities have proved resilient and political loyalties seem 
deep-rooted. The major political parties have proved more adept at forging 
racially-based, cross-class than cross-racial coalitions. There are signs of the 
growing salience of class, but not in the electoral arena. 
 
                                                          
1 This paper draws heavily on Seekings and Nattrass (2004) as well as Seekings, Leibbrandt 





The Changing Electorate 
 
The electorate changes even if there are no major social and economic shifts in 
society. Between elections, some voters die, others reach voting age for the first 
time, some emigrate and others immigrate. Voters also migrate within the 
country, affecting provincial electoral contests. 
 
South Africa’s 2001 Population Census provides an indication of the importance 
of demographic change in the potential electorate. South Africa’s adult 
population (i.e. aged eighteen years or older) stood at 27.4 million in 2001. Of 
these potential voters, 4.7 million (or 17%) were aged between eighteen and 
twenty-two years old, which means that in 2004, 17% of the potential electorate 
would have been too young to have voted in the 1999 elections.2 A similar 
number were between the ages of twenty-three and twenty-seven, meaning that 
they would have been too young to have voted in the first democratic elections, 
in 1994. Therefore, one-third of the potential electorate in 2004 was too young 
to have voted in 1994. This is a largely post-apartheid generation of voters, with 
possibly different perceptions and attitudes to their elders. 
 
Between 1994 and 2004, South Africa’s population did not grow uniformly. 
Lower birth rates and higher emigration rates reduced the white proportion of 
the electorate. If the election had been held in 2001, 12% of the potential 
electorate would have been white, 9% coloured, 3% Indian and 75% African.3 
With every passing year, the white proportion has been declining and the 
African share rising. In the 2004 elections, about 83% of the potential first-time 
voters were African, 8% were coloured, 2% were Indian and just 7% were 
white.4  
 
These demographic changes will, ultimately, impact on voting patterns as the 
new generation, with a different racial profile and no personal experience of 
apartheid, begins to exercise its electoral muscle. This could, in time, erode the 
strength of support for the ANC. For the moment, however, demographic 
changes seem to have strengthened the ANC relative to the opposition parties 
which competed primarily for the declining proportion of white, coloured and 
Indian votes.   
 
                                                          
2 The assumption here is that the age structure in 2004 is roughly the same as in 2001. 
3 Throughout this paper, the conventional racial labels will be used: “black” refers to 
Coloured, Indian and African South Africans, while “African” refers to members of the 
Bantu/indigenous African groups. 






Income Inequality and Unemployment   
 
Alongside demographic changes, economic patterns have shifted as well. 
Between the 1970s and 1990s, patterns of inequality slowly changed, with inter-
racial inequality declining and intra-racial inequality growing (Whiteford and 
van Seventer 2000). This trend continued after 1994. Data from the 1995 and 
2000 Income and Expenditure Surveys (IESs) suggest that the white share of 
total income declined from about 49% in 1995 to about 46% in 2000, while the 
African and coloured shares rose.55 In 1995, 73% of the individuals in the top 
income decile (the richest 10%) were white, and only 18% African. By 2000, 
only 61% of the households in the top decile were white, and 25% were African. 
The racial composition of the top two income deciles shifted dramatically over a 
very short period of time. There were, by 2000, about as many African 
households in the top income quintile (20%) as there were white households. At 
the same time, the Gini coefficient for income distribution within the African 
population rose from about 0.56 in 1995 to about 0.61 in 2000.66 
 
These changes in inter- and intra-racial inequality reflect a continuing shift from 
race to class as the basis of South African inequality (Seekings and Nattrass, 
forthcoming). Perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of this has been the 
accelerating growth of the African elite and middle-classes. The new African 
middle-class comprises people in salaried jobs (such as managers and university 
lecturers), professionals, and entrepreneurs and capitalists. Upward occupational 
mobility, assisted by affirmative action, and reflected in the distribution of 
salaries has clearly caused more change in patterns of income distribution than 
black economic empowerment through business opportunities.  
 
The best data on black upward mobility into top income categories are data for 
the public sector. The proportion of managers at all levels who were African 
rose from 30% in 1995 to over 51% in 2001, with the total black proportion 
rising from 40% to over 63%. Changes in the composition of senior 
management are more muted, but nevertheless by 2001 there were more black 
than white senior managers (Thompson and Woolard 2002). The 2001 census 
suggested that, in the public and private sectors combined, there were still more 
white than black “legislators, senior officials and managers” (56% vs. 44%) and 
equal numbers of professionals, but there were many more black than white 
“technicians and associate professionals” (69% vs. 31%). If these three 
                                                          
5  It should be noted that survey data from Statistics South Africa have clear flaws. The figures 
reported here use weights calculated by Ingrid Woolard and Charles Simkins, not the weights 
suggested by Statistics SA. Findings on some inequality trends are very sensitive to the choice 
of weights, and to the choice between income and expenditure data. 
6 Some of these calculations were done by Murray Leibbrandt, and reported in Seekings, 





categories are combined, there are many more black than white people in them 
(57% vs. 43%, with 41% African). The pace of transformation in the private 
sector is clearly slower than in the public sector, but even a slower pace of 
change results in significant shifts in the relationship between race and class in 
South Africa.  
 
The changing racial composition of these high-earning occupations reflects 
several factors. First, there is a rising supply of African and black graduates 
from universities and technikons. Second, emigration has reduced the supply of 
white professionals and managers, leaving more room at the top for African and 
black men and women. Thirdly, active policies of affirmative action and, to a 
lesser extent, black economic empowerment have inflated the demand for black 
and especially African personnel. This last factor provides the growing African 
middle-classes with strong incentives to support the ANC. 
 
If expanding opportunities for upward mobility into or within the middle-class 
provided good reasons for some to vote for the incumbent party, it might be 
expected that rising unemployment and declining formal employment would 
have given many other ANC supporters good reasons to withdraw their support. 
Unemployment rates continued to rise after 1994, from about 20% to over 30% 
(in terms of the official, or strict, definition of unemployment) or from about 
30% to over 40% (using the more appropriate expanded definition) (Nattrass 
2000; 2003). Rising unemployment increases inequality. In South Africa, where 
there is no subsistence agricultural sector to fall back on, unemployment is 
closely associated with poverty (Bhorat et al. 2001; Seekings 2000). 
 
In between the prospering middle-classes and the impoverished unemployed lies 
the bulk of the working population. The new Labour Relations Act strengthened 
the bargaining position of organised labour, so that wages were insulated from 
the pressures of massive unemployment. Workers in formal, regular 
employment prospered, as long as they kept their jobs. Facing rising wages 
despite unemployment, employers sought to reduce their labour costs through 
either investing in more capital-intensive production or out-sourcing labour-
intensive activities. The result was continuing “re-segmentation” in the labour 
market, with a deepening divide between workers in formal, regular 
employment, mostly with skills, and those in casual or contract employment, 
mostly unskilled (Kenny and Webster 1998). Across the economy as a whole, 
the demand for unskilled labour has plummeted. Real average remuneration 
therefore grew at the same time as formal employment fell (Fedderke and 
Mariotti 2002; Bhorat and Hodge 1999; Edwards 2001; Simbi and Aliber 2000).  
There is some evidence from surveys related to how earnings have changed over 





earnings of workers in regular employment rose by 30% between 1993 and 
1998, compared to an overall average change in earnings of just 7% (Cichello, 
Fields, and Leibbrandt 2001). The earnings of workers in regular employment 
grew faster than the average for everyone in the panel. Some of this spectacular 
increase was because new entrants into formal employment had higher wages 
than those who left. But even among workers who were in formal employment 
in both 1993 and 1998, earnings rose by 20% (Ibid: 132).  
 
This does not mean that all members of these working-classes prospered. The 
earnings of workers who lost or left their jobs plummeted, because few of the 
people unable to find formal employment are absorbed into the informal sector. 
South Africa is unusual in that it is a middle income developing country with 
high unemployment and a relatively small informal sector. The few people who 
do end up in the informal sector, tend to earn very low incomes (Berry et al. 
2002; Simkins 2003).  
 
If unemployment is one of the most pressing socio-economic characteristics of 
post-apartheid South Africa, HIV/AIDS is surely the second. In 2003, an 
estimated 14% of all South Africans were HIV-positive, with more than one 
thousand people dying each day of AIDS. For households where bread-winners 
lose jobs due to poor health, or where children are withdrawn from school to 
care for sick family members, or for children whose parents die, the 
consequences of AIDS are clearly massive. Although the evidence is unclear, 
and much depends on the dynamic responses of employers to the pandemic, it 
appears likely that AIDS will worsen inequality in South Africa (Nattrass 2004). 
 
 
Redistribution Through the Budget 
 
The electoral implications of persistent poverty and rising unemployment are 
muted in part because of redistributive social policies. South Africa redistributes 
more extensively through the fiscus than any other developing country for which 
data is readily available (Seekings 2002a). Van der Berg has recently estimated 
that the Gini coefficient for the distribution of income is reduced by about 18 
percentage points (to about 0.50) if taxes and cash transfers are taken into 
account, and by a further six percentage points (to perhaps 0.44) if the value of 
in kind public social spending (primarily in the areas of health care and 
education) is taken into account (van der Berg 2001a). This redistribution occurs 
primarily through three mechanisms: a progressive and efficient tax system; an 
exceptional public welfare system based primarily on de facto universal and 





combined with high enrolment rates among poor children (Nattrass and 
Seekings 2001; Seekings 2002a). 
 
In South Africa, the top income quintile pays at least three-quarters of all tax, 
including almost all income taxes and two-thirds of Value-Added Tax (VAT) 
(McGrath 1997; van der Berg 2001b). This is one of the reasons why tax funded 
public expenditure is redistributive. It also means that there is a narrow tax base, 
even though the Treasury has benefited from improved efficiency in tax 
collection since 1994. Further increases in tax revenues would require either 
increasing taxes on the rich, who are already heavily taxed, or extending the tax 
base through increasing tax rates on less rich classes. The former might have 
economic costs, the latter has obvious political costs. 
 
While taxation is primarily paid by the rich, social spending is heavily focused 
on the poor.  Despite the fiscally conservative Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, social spending rose in real terms in the decade 
after 1994 and became more pro-poor. The proportion of public spending in the 
areas of education, health, social assistance, housing and water that was directed 
towards households in the bottom income quintile rose from 31% in 1993 to 
33% in 1997. The proportion spent on the top quintile was reduced dramatically 
to just eight percent (van der Berg 2001a). Welfare spending is very pro-poor, 
especially taking into consideration old age pensions, disability grants and the 
new child support grant. By 2004, almost six million people – or one in seven 
South Africans – received one or other non-contributory government grant. 
Education spending also became much more pro-poor after 1994. Teachers in 
rural areas especially were paid more, teaching posts were allocated from richer 
to poorer schools, and non-personnel expenditure was concentrated on poor 
schools.  
 
South Africa might be exceptional in terms of the scale of redistribution from 
rich to poor through the budget, but this does not mean that poverty is 
eliminated. South Africa has a generous and inclusive system of social 
assistance. Yet, this safety net has a loose weave and many poor people fall 
through the holes (Samson 2002). Crucially, there is no cash support for 
households that include no pensioners, no disabled people and no young 
children, i.e. for households that are poor because they include unemployed 
people who are able-bodied and of working age. To address this problem, the 
Government-appointed Taylor Committee (the Committee of Inquiry into a 
Comprehensive System of Social Security in South Africa) recommended the 
conditional and phased introduction of a basic income grant (BIG) paying R100 
to every South African, regardless of income or need. Even if financed out of 





reduction (le Roux 2002; Bhorat 2003). The ANC-led Government did not 
accept the proposal. The welfare system thus continues to achieve very uneven 
poverty reduction, despite being redistributive. The benefits in kind of public 
expenditure on education are also of limited advantage to the poor, given the 
low quality of much public education and the poor prospects for the less skilled 
in securing well-paid jobs. Finally, pro-poor expenditure on health care did not 
mean the provision of anti-retroviral drugs to poor people with AIDS. Whilst 
rich people could access drugs through medical aid schemes, poor people died.  
 
 
Inequality and Identity 
 
Under apartheid, South African politics was unsurprisingly racialised. With 
deracialisation, but persistent inequality, massive unemployment and a 
devastating AIDS pandemic, one might have expected politics to realign around 
class. Discontented voters might be expected to defect from the incumbent 
ANC, and support existing or new parties that would champion the interests of 
the poor majority against those of the increasingly multi-racial elite. To date this 
has not happened, in large part because class has not eclipsed race as the 
primary basis of social identity and few poor people hold the government 
responsible for their continuing poverty. 
 
The first requirement for more class-oriented politics is that political attitudes 
must begin to orient around class rather than other social cleavages. In South 
Africa, citizens continue to select racial identities in preference to class identities 
in surveys. The 2000 Afrobarometer survey, for example, found that South 
Africans volunteered racial, ethnic or linguistic identities five times more often 
than class ones (a higher ratio even than in Nigeria). Friedman has argued that 
South African politics revolves around racial identity rather than class interests. 
This, he suggests, may be good for democracy but bad for redistribution, as 
“identity politics … may limit both prospects for reducing inequality and the 
threat which it poses to the survival of formal democratic politics.” (Friedman 
and Chipkin 2001: 16; see also Friedman 1999). 
 
At the same time, there are indications of a rising class consciousness. In early 
2003, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation included in its ‘Reconciliation 
Barometer’ a question on South Africans’ perception of the biggest division in 
the country. The precise wording was: 
 
People sometimes talk about the divisions between people in South 
Africa. Sometimes these divisions can cause people to feel left out or 





even violence between groups. What, in your experience, is the biggest 
division in South Africa today? 
 
The options presented to the respondents were: 
 
(1) The division between different political parties, like the ANC and 
IFP. (2) The division between poor and middle income/wealthy South 
Africans. (3) The division between those living with HIV/AIDS and 
other infectious diseases, and the rest of the community. (4) The 
division between members of different religions. (5) The divisions 
between Black, White, Coloured and Indian South Africans. (6) The 
divisions between South Africans of different language groups. 
 
The wording of the question might have led respondents to select either race (i.e. 
the fifth option), because of the reference to discrimination or parties (i.e. the 
first option), because of the reference to violence. Only one in five of the 
respondents selected the fifth option, with a similar proportion selecting the first 
option. More respondents, (30%) selected the second option: class. Within each 
racial group, class was the most popular option: 29% of white and African 
respondents pointed to class as the biggest division in South Africa, and a 
slightly higher proportion of coloured and Indian respondents. Interestingly, 
responses do not seem to be related to household income. 
 
The apparently limited salience of class consciousness does not mean that  
poorer people are content. South Africans prioritise job creation and crime as by 
far the two most important problems facing the country and express strong 
discontent with the government’s performance on both issues. Yet, there are few 
signs of a distinct consciousness among the unemployed. One reason for this is 
that state policies that might contribute to unemployment, and hence inequality, 
are unusually opaque. It is not easy for poor people to trace the links between 
the state’s industrial and labour market policies and unemployment and poverty, 
even if these policies contribute to rising capital intensity and productivity rather 
than job creation.  
 
Indeed, whilst South African voters, including the ANC’s own supporters, 
consistently identify unemployment as the most important problem facing the 
country and rate the Government’s performance on unemployment as very poor, 
they do not generally hold the Government responsible for unemployment. The 
ANC-led government might be responding inadequately, but the causes of 
unemployment are seen to lie elsewhere (Nattrass and Seekings 2002; Seekings 





governing party to power with large majorities despite poorly rating its 
performance on the most important issue facing the country. 
 
While material discontent co-exists with enduring racial identities among the 
poor, there are some signs of change in public attitudes. Mattes (2002) reports 
that surveys show declining confidence in the economy and trust in government. 
By 2000, he found that only one in three African respondents expected the 
economy to improve over the following year, and barely half said that the 
President was interested in their opinions (with even a smaller proportion saying 
this of Parliament). A sense of relative deprivation also seemed to be increasing: 
 
Even in 1995, despite one of the highest rates of income inequality in 
the world, only 32 percent of South Africans said they were worse off 
than others. This was largely due to the fact that black South Africans 
tended to compare themselves to other blacks rather than to whites. By 
mid-2000, however, this figure had increased sharply to 50 percent. In 
the same survey, 31 percent of blacks said their lives were worse now 
than under apartheid, up sharply from 13 percent in 1997 (Mattes 2002: 
32). 
 
Activists to the left of the ANC see data such as this and hopefully claim that 
there is a growing tide of militant class consciousness among the poor. Desai 
suggests that popular consciousness is even being internationalised, becoming 
part of the global struggle against “neo-liberalism.” Radicalised by their 
experiences of eviction or disconnection for non-payment of rent or service 
charges, “the poors,” as they have come to be known in the South African 
vernacular, “have begun making connections between their situation and that of 
people, first in Soweto and Tafelsig [Cape Town], but then also in Bolivia, 
South Korea, America’s prisons, Zimbabwe and Chiapas” (Desai 2003). There 
is little evidence, however, that this militant class consciousness extends beyond 
small circles of activists in particular areas. 
 
Overall, the available evidence suggests that racial identities have proved 
resilient, even as a consciousness of class has increased. The resilience of racial 
identity is in part due to constant reinforcement by the ANC, both as the 
government and as a competitive political party. As the governing party, the 
ANC has taken political advantage of a range of pro-poor policies that it 
inherited in 1994 and strengthened thereafter. The party is adept at building new 
clinics and schools in areas where it is electorally threatened, such as the Eastern 
Cape in 1999. The recent willingness of the ANC to spend more on social 
policies might indicate a growing concern to retain the support of the rural poor. 





they are bound to have an impact on people’s identities, especially since 
redistribution through the fiscus is extensive, as shown above.  
 
The ANC also plays the race card effectively in elections, preserving a racial 
cross-class coalition (Davis 2003).  Whatever his intention, the effect of 
President Mbeki using the racialised discourse of “two nations” can only be to 
shore up racial identities and racialised allegiances. Racial privilege, rather than 
inequality more broadly, is the ANC’s target. ANC supporters have remained 
loyal to the ANC in part because they give the party credit for democratisation. 
The strength of partisan identification with the ANC is similar to the strength of 
partisan identification with the Democratic Party in the USA after a similar 
defining moment in American politics, the New Deal. 
 
Even if public attitudes were more focused around class rather than race, there 
might be little opportunity for these attitudes to translate into more class-
oriented political behaviour. Two features of the political system serve to 
constrain change in the patterns of political activity. First, the ANC commands 
sufficient patronage to keep most senior black politicians on board, denuding 
most opposition parties of high-profile black leadership. The electoral system 
provides the ANC leadership with an important source of patronage: places on 
the ANC electoral lists. Control over appointments in both state and parastatal 
sectors, and opportunities for both legitimate and illegitimate business activities, 
all serve to keep aspiring black elites behind the party. Secondly, and partly in 
consequence, the major opposition parties are not attractive to disillusioned 
ANC supporters (Mattes and Piombo 2001). The result is that the party system 
remains racialised. As Friedman puts it, there is no class-based party competing 
for power; insofar as struggles over class occur, it is within not between 
racialised alliances (Friedman and Chipkin 2001). 
 
AIDS, like unemployment, is yet to have clear electoral implications. The 
government’s non-response to AIDS prompted strong criticism from opposition 
parties and the emergence of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), a high 
profile activist organisation. The TAC successfully used the courts and media to 
effect changes in government policy. But the TAC is not a mass organisation 
and public criticism of government policy has not led voters to support other 
political parties. HIV-positive people are not a well-defined political 
constituency. This might be due to the lower importance that voters attach to 
health, compared to other issues such as unemployment and crime. South 
Africans do not seem to acknowledge that there is a major problem with AIDS. 
Even if the problem is acknowledged, the government might be seen as 






Expectations of Mobility 
 
There is another possible explanation of the acquiescence of poor voters. Voters 
might be making decisions about political allegiance and protest based not so 
much on current social or economic positions as on their expected future 
positions. Citizens’ perceptions of opportunities for upward mobility might be 
expected to shape their identities and allegiances as well as their judgements on 
the legitimacy of inequality. The perception that economic liberalisation might 
promote a more meritocratic society might explain why poor voters in a number 
of new democracies have endorsed market reforms, even when those reforms 
have heightened inequality (Birdsall and Graham 2000).  
 
In South Africa, there is evidence that expectations are shaping political 
behaviour. Most poor voters have remained loyal to the ANC in part because 
they are patient in waiting for their expectations of change to be fulfilled 
(Charney 1995; Nattrass and Seekings 1998). Perhaps these voters’ expectations 
of future improvements are more important than their experiences of hardship, 
even deepening hardship, now.  At its height, apartheid entailed an 
unprecedented system for improving the opportunities open to white people 
whilst restricting those open to black people. With the end of apartheid, the 
distribution of opportunities has surely moved in a more meritocratic direction.  
 
There is indeed some “absolute” upward mobility by black South Africans. 
Absolute mobility is due to changes in the overall class structure: an expansion 
of higher class occupations pulls in some individuals from lower-class 
backgrounds. In the late twentieth century, the expansion over time of semi-
skilled, skilled and white-collar employment meant new opportunities for 
upward mobility for many African people (Crankshaw 1997). It is not unusual 
for a young office-worker to have a father who was a semi-skilled or skilled 
worker in manufacturing and/or a mother who was a domestic worker, and 
grandparents who were farm-workers, unskilled migrant mineworkers, or who 
never had formal employment and never left their homes in the reserves. 
 
But access to new opportunities is clearly not spread evenly across all sections 
of the African population. More room for African people at the top has not meant 
that all African people face similar chances of getting there. The relative mobility 
rate for individuals from lower-class backgrounds is lower than for individuals 
who start off in higher classes. The dismantling of racial discrimination, 
improved public and private schooling, and policies of affirmative action and 
black economic empowerment have changed relative mobility rates. Some, 
mostly urban, African households enjoy greatly superior access to the new 





employment, and the social capital (or contacts) necessary to secure such 
employment. Other African households, especially in remote bantustan 
settlements, lack education and social capital. This underclass is “truly 
disadvantaged” in terms of its marginalisation in the labour market, i.e. its lack 
of access to opportunities (Seekings 2003b). Such disadvantage also seems to be 
reproduced between generations. In other words, the children of poor parents face 
immense difficulties in rising out of poverty (Seekings 2003a). 
 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic only aggravates these problems. Trends in inter-
generational and intra-generational mobility as well as in morbidity and mortality 
due to AIDS suggest that the poor suffer enduring disadvantages in a range of 
respects. Children growing up in poor households are likely to be disadvantaged in 
terms of both human capital (i.e. educational attainment) and social capital (in 
terms of connections in the labour market). They are much more likely to spend 
their lives in intermittent employment and unemployment, with their employment 
comprising unskilled and often casual work and their spells of unemployment 
being long. They are also more likely to become sick and die, leaving dependents 
in an especially weak position.  
 
The currently available analysis of and evidence on mobility suggest that the South 
African economy is something like a game of snakes and ladders. The snakes are 
the shocks of job loss, the disability or death of a breadwinner due to AIDS, and 
perhaps also the experiences of crime and social obligations that wipe out the 
savings of entrepreneurs and inhibit capital accumulation. The ladders involve, 
above all, getting a job, but also, less directly, acquiring social and human capital. 
The snakes appear to be distributed fairly randomly, meaning that people in all 
sorts of social or economic positions are vulnerable. Retrenchment, AIDS-related 
morbidity and mortality, and even the loss of savings affect both poor and well-off 
households. But the ladders are not distributed randomly. Relatively disadvantaged 
households are less likely to find ladders than relatively advantaged ones. They are 
less likely to acquire the human and social capital that helps secure any 
employment and especially better-paid employment. Spells of unemployment are 
likely to be longer, the effects of AIDS-related morbidity or mortality more 
enduring, and the experiences of crime or social obligations more devastating.  
 
Unfortunately, little research has been conducted on the relationship between 
disadvantage and perceptions of opportunity and future prospects, or between 
these and a wider range of social and political attitudes. How do people in different 
positions in society assess their prospects? How do they perceive the possibilities 
of encountering either snakes or ladders? And what do they anticipate would be 







Attitudinal surveys have indicated that African citizens have been, in general, 
optimistic about the future, although their optimism may have declined at the very 
end of the 1990s. They are more positive than citizens in, for example, Brazil in 
their assessment of the chances of poor people to escape from poverty, and are 
more likely to attribute poverty to laziness. Their support for the ANC has been 
closely linked to their optimism about the future. It is unclear, however, whether 
optimism is related to perceived current or prospective opportunities, or how such 
perceived opportunities are in fact congruent with real opportunities.  
 
Leaving aside methodological and evidential concerns, there are good reasons to 
doubt whether, less than ten years after the fall of apartheid, new patterns of 
stratification are likely to lead to clearly differentiated social attitudes or political 
responses. The ANC is clearly adept at marshalling its resources, both symbolic 
(as in the charisma of the inimitable Nelson Mandela) and material (as in the 
construction of new clinics and schools), in order to ward off electoral challenges. 
In local government elections, critical independent candidates have generally 
struggled to make headway against official ANC candidates even when the latter 
were regarded as having performed poorly. Anecdotal impressions suggest that 
discontent with the government over unemployment is becoming more politically 
consequential, especially as the ANC elite is seen as feathering its own nest. In the 
longer term, the pressures on the ANC might intensify, and with them the 
incentive for the ANC to tackle the factors that appear to trap so many families in 
disadvantaged trajectories. In the shorter term, however, the more likely outcome 
of discontent is lower voter turnout rather than intensified electoral competition.  
 
 
The Politics of Redistribution 
 
One reason why social and economic changes have not had visible electoral 
implications is that disputes are, to a considerable extent, contained within the 
ANC Alliance. At a rhetorical level, and sometimes substantively, COSATU 
and the (other parts of the) ANC have clashed over policy. Some scholars view 
both the ANC and COSATU as having sold out or betrayed the more radical 
objectives of the anti-apartheid struggle (McKinley 2001; Bond 2000; Marais 
1998). The ANC’s neo-liberal policies – especially trade liberalisation, 
privatisation, fiscal austerity and cost recovery in urban services – are seen as 
being against the interests of the poor and working-class. Other scholars see 
South Africa as moving instead towards a class compromise, in which business 
has done well but labour has also secured gains, notably through labour market 





benefited through social policy, with the social wage helping to make up for low 
(or no) wages earned in the labour market.  
 
Nattrass and Seekings implicitly agreed with some of the ANC’s claims in 
arguing that there was a “double class compromise” in South Africa, in terms of 
which business secured broadly pro-business macro-economic policies, the 
working-class secured higher wages and the poor secured pro-poor social 
policies (2001). We suggested that the poor exerted some power through the 
ballot box, i.e. that the electoral power of the poor was one factor in the ANC’s 
pro-poor social policies. The weakness of this argument is that some of the gains 
apparently made by the poor were actually gains won by other, non-poor social 
groups. For example, the big increase in pro-poor social expenditure after 1994 
was in education, where increased spending on teachers’ salaries certainly did 
not result in matching improvements in the quality of schooling enjoyed by poor 
children. Increased spending on the poor reflected in large part a transfer to 
teachers, who are definitely not poor. This points us to a central issue in the 
politics of redistribution in South Africa: the social groups with the political 
power to extract concessions from the state or capital are non-poor groups. Very 
few of COSATU’s members are in the poorest half of the population in South 
Africa. Most live in households with incomes above the median but below the 
mean; they are thus disadvantaged relative to the rich (mostly white) minority 
but they themselves enjoy a position that is privileged relative to the poor. Some 
COSATU-affiliated unions, including the teachers’ union, SADTU, have 
membership mostly in households with incomes above even the mean. 
 
The limits to change in the politics of distribution in South Africa are evident in 
two recent political controversies. The first is the debate (or rather non-debate) 
over the basic income grant (BIG). The “BIG Coalition” brings together a range 
of human rights and church groups, as well as  COSATU, but only the unions 
are capable of mobilising mass support. The unions support the basic income 
grant in part out of self-interest, not because union members would benefit 
directly from the grant but because of indirect benefits. The grant would reduce 
the pressures on workers to support dependent kin and might also deflect 
criticism of the unions’ demand for high wages (which arguably undermines job 
creation). But these indirect benefits are insufficient to lead the unions to push 
the issue and threaten their alliance with the ANC, and so COSATU has not 
forced the ANC to seriously consider the proposals. Unions do not organise the 
poorest of the poor, but actually represent relatively privileged sections of 
society (Matisonn and Seekings 2003). 
 
Secondly, several South African cities have seen a resurgence of  “social 





globalisation activist networks (Desai 2003). These mobilisations are typically 
single-issue protests (including protests against evictions for non-payment of 
rent or bond payments, disconnections of electricity and water supplies for non-
payment, and so on), and involve very localised constituencies. More 
importantly, they entail conflict over the symptoms of inequality, i.e. an inability 
to pay for municipal services or for housing, not the causes of inequality, such as 
low quality public schooling, high unemployment, and government policies that 
undermine labour-intensive growth. It is difficult to see these localised and 
ephemeral conflicts cohering into a truly mass movement of any consequence. 
 
Electoral pressures might push the ANC-led government into pro-poor spending, 
but this is likely to be more discretionary (such as new schools, clinics or public 
works programmes) rather than programmatic (such as a basic income grant). 
The uneasy balance of power between established ‘white’ business, aspirant 
‘black’ business and organised labour is unlikely to shift enough to allow for 
major reforms in government strategy. Without policies that encourage the 
growth of low-wage jobs for the unskilled unemployed and promote more 
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The CSSR is an umbrella organisation comprising five units:  
 
The Aids and Society Research Unit (ASRU) supports quantitative 
and qualitative research into the social and economic impact of 
the HIV pandemic in Southern Africa.  Focus areas include:  the 
economics of reducing mother to child transmission of HIV, the 
impact of HIV on firms and households; and psychological 
aspects of HIV infection and prevention.  ASRU operates an 
outreach programme in Khayelitsha (the Memory Box Project) 
which provides training and counselling for HIV positive people 
 
The Data First Resource Unit (‘Data First’) provides training and 
resources for research.  Its main functions are: 1) to provide 
access to digital data resources and specialised published 
material; 2) to facilitate the collection, exchange and use of data 
sets on a collaborative basis; 3) to provide basic and advanced 
training in data analysis; 4) the ongoing development of a web 
site to disseminate data and research output.    
 
The Democracy in Africa Research Unit (DARU) supports students 
and scholars who conduct systematic research in the following 
three areas:  1) public opinion and political culture in Africa and 
its role in democratisation and consolidation; 2) elections and 
voting in Africa; and 3) the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on 
democratisation in Southern Africa. DARU has developed close 
working relationships with projects such as the Afrobarometer (a 
cross national survey of public opinion in fifteen African countries), 
the Comparative National Elections Project, and the Health 
Economics and AIDS Research Unit at the University of Natal. 
 
The Social Surveys Unit (SSU) promotes critical analysis of the 
methodology, ethics and results of South African social science 
research. One core activity is the Cape Area Panel Study of 
young adults in Cape Town.  This study follows 4800 young people 
as they move from school into the labour market and adulthood.  
The SSU is also planning a survey for 2004 on aspects of social 
capital, crime, and attitudes toward inequality. 
 
The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit 
(SALDRU) was established in 1975 as part of the School of 
Economics and joined the CSSR in 2002.  SALDRU conducted the 
first national household survey in 1993 (the Project for Statistics on 
Living Standards and Development).  More recently, SALDRU ran 
the Langeberg Integrated Family survey (1999) and the 
Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain Survey (2000).  Current projects 
include research on public works programmes, poverty and 
inequality.  
 
 
 
